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ABSTRACT
This article examines the application of the piercing the corporate veil concept in
international arbitration. Interpretation of this concept is inconsistent even within
one domestic legal system, and it is even less predictable in international arbitration
when several legal systems come into play. Piercing the corporate veil may help to
give a concrete practical meaning to the purpose of an arbitration agreement or a
bilateral investment treaty. However, there are downsides of such piercing because
it negates many of the benefits which the corporate form offers.
Domestic courts are likely not to recognize and enforce an arbitration award
piercing the corporate veil in the absence of a written arbitration agreement.
Jurisprudence under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”) Convention allows one to avoid the enforcement problem. However, the
1
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approaches of ICSID tribunals are inconsistent. This article identifies three major
conceptual approaches ICSID tribunals took in the past, namely: (1) declining
jurisdiction in the absence of an explicit arbitration agreement, (2) piercing the veil
by looking into the issue of foreign control, and (3) piercing the veil on the basis of
interpretation of the concept of “investment” in accordance with the intent of parties
to the arbitration agreement or purpose of an international treaty.
The practical advice offered by this article is to make written arbitration clauses
as inclusive as possible, to avoid dealing with piercing the corporate veil altogether.
I. INTRODUCTION
King Solomon ended up not splitting the baby when he understood who the real
parent of the child was.2 Almost three thousand years after King Solomon, the
judges and arbitrators might be fully aware of the real parent of the company, but it
is very difficult to predict whether they would split the rights and liabilities, or treat
the group of companies as one entity.
When parties conclude a number of contracts at realization of a common
economic transaction, advance planning for dispute resolution becomes an inherently
complex issue.3 One of these complexities involves piercing the corporate veil. The
primary impression such piercing leaves is that of uncertainty and unpredictability.
Such uncertainties are detrimental to the legitimate expectations of the parties to a
contractual relationship, and involve serious risks associated with the enforcement of
arbitration awards.
Although tribunals refer to the theory of group companies and other theories for
piercing the corporate veil, they often use them without a clear explanation. As one
commentator warned, “[i]n debating whether to pierce the corporate veil or treat the
principal as the alter ego of the subsidiary, the arbitration community often appears
to rely on ‘worn epithets’ as a substitute for ‘rigorous analysis.’”4 This article
purports to shed more light on the concept of piercing the corporate veil in
international arbitration, both commercially and arising out of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs).
Part I discusses the concepts of corporate personality, limited liability, and
piercing the corporate veil in the theory of corporate law. It first summarizes the
main benefits of corporate form–separation of assets, improved monitoring, and ease
of coordination with creditors. Then it looks into conceptual foundations of
unlimited corporate liability and veil piercing.
The article continues with the analysis of piercing the corporate veil in
international commercial arbitration. Part II examines and explains specific
problems that arise when the concept is examined through the lenses of several
domestic and international legal regimes. Problems arise at the jurisdictional stage
and when the tribunals consider the merits. Even if a tribunal decides to pierce the
corporate veil, the award may be set aside in national courts that have jurisdiction
over the arbitration venue. Because of the veil piercing, the award can be contested
when the interested party enforces it in domestic courts under the New York
2

1 Kings 12:19.

3

Gillis Wetter, A Multi-Party Arbitration Scheme for International Joint Ventures, 3
ARB. INT’L 2 (1987).
4

First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983).
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Convention. At each of these stages, the arbitrators or judges may reach completely
different results with respect to veil piercing.
Part III focuses on ICSID jurisprudence. ICSID awards do not need to be
recognized in national courts or defended at the arbitration venue. Review of ICSID
jurisprudence shows that even under the special procedural regime of the ICSID
Convention, the attitudes of ICSID tribunals are inconsistent. Some tribunals refuse
to assert jurisdiction over corporations that have not signed the arbitration agreement
on the basis of absence of consent. Other tribunals look into the issue of foreign
control to decide whether to extend jurisdiction. Finally, some ICSID tribunals look
at corporate entities as a part of investment, and extend subject matter and personal
jurisdiction over corporations that have not signed the arbitration agreement. The
latter approach is justified by looking into the purpose of BITs that are concluded to
protect foreign investments from host States.
Part IV concludes by summarizing the pros and cons of piercing the corporate
veil and suggests careful drafting of arbitration clauses to avoid taking chances with
such piercing in international arbitration.
II. CORPORATE FORM AND VEIL PIERCING
A. The Rationale Behind the Corporate Form
To better understand the concept of piercing the corporate veil, it is helpful to
examine the need for having the corporate form in the first place.
Arguably, the main function of corporate law is defining the property rights over
which the participants in a firm can enter into contracts.5 Henry Hansmann and
Rainier Kraakman explained that “the essential role of . . . organizational law is to
provide for the creation of a pattern of creditors’ rights – a form of ‘asset
partitioning’–that could not be practically established otherwise.”6
Corporate law scholars divide the benefits of corporate limited liability into three
groups – separation of assets, improved monitoring, and ease of coordination with
creditors. Ronald Coase was the first to explain corporate form by the need for the
reduction of transaction costs of market coordination with third parties.7 Limited
liability facilitates the transfer of ownership by allowing owners to separate
corporate liabilities from their own.8 While, in theory, partitioning of assets with
each and every creditor separately may be technically possible, the transaction costs
would be prohibitively high.9
Corporate asset partitioning therefore shifts the burden of monitoring the firm’s
managers from the owners to the creditors.10 Other benefits of asset partition include

5
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387, 440 (2000).
6

Id. at 390.

7

See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).

8

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 426.

9

Id. at 406-07.

10

Id. at 425.
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shielding the assets of a firm from the personal creditors of individual owners,11 and
the costs of conducting business through the creation of subsidiaries.12
There are two major theories concerning corporate personality – the theory of
legal fiction, and the entity theory. According to the legal fiction theory, a
corporation is a nexus of contracts, a more convenient way of structuring
relationships with third parties, thereby limiting the participants’ liability.13 The
entity theory is based on the premise that the state created the corporation by
granting it a charter, and, therefore, it has a separate “personhood.”14
The legal fiction supporters argue that the property might be given special
qualities by the state or through contract, but remains property all the same.15 Thus,
the existence of a corporation independent of its owners is a fiction: “the rights and
duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties of the persons
who compose it, and not of an imaginary being.”16 The entity theory school regards
a corporation as an autonomous institutional actor separable from those with an
interest in it.17
Very often, reorganization of corporate structure in corporate groups involves
segregation of especially risky activities in selected subsidiaries to shield the group
as a whole from tort liabilities.18 As Professor Blumberg put it, in such business
planning, traditional entity law is being utilized to attempt to create a safe harbor for
corporate groups seeking to externalize the costs of a subsidiary’s negligence in
conducting highly risky activities.19
The principles of state sovereignty and political territoriality make separation of
assets even more attractive. When corporations are dispersed across jurisdictions
with different rules of corporate law, the corporate form allows even more flexibility
for the owners to structure their assets and limit the reach of creditors.
11

Id. at 393-94.

12

Id. at 398, 402.

13

"The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a
nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by existence of divisible
residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold
without permission of the other contracting individuals." See, e.g. Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
14

See, e.g., Mark Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational ‘Real
Entity’ Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 575-77 (1989).
15
VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE
1886).
16

ON THE

LAW

OF

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 2 (2d ed.

Id. at 3.

17

Gunther Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the “Essence" of
the Legal Person, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 130 (1988).
18

See, e.g. Richard Rothman, A Veiled Threat: Minimizing Parental Liability for U.S.
Subsidiaries, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY, August 23, 2007.
19
PHILLIP BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER
COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS (Little, Brown and Co. 1987).
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The commercial world regards the principle of separation of legal identity and
liability between different companies as a universal legal assumption. All major
industrial countries recognize this principle.20 The development of sophisticated
multinational corporate structures was a response to various commercial factors,
such as business expansion and diversification, the need for specialization and
efficient productive processes, raising capital finance, or reducing taxation liabilities.
B. The Concept of Piercing the Corporate Veil
Piercing the corporate veil essentially means disregarding the separation between
entities organized in corporate form with limited liability of shareholders.
A typical corporate veil piercing case involves a controlling shareholder who sets
up an undercapitalized corporation to incur obligations to a third party. When the
debt is due, the corporation does not have enough assets to repay it, and the
controlling shareholder relies on the concept of limited liability to avoid personal
liability. The result is that the third party ends up bearing the risk of the nonpayment of the debt.21 In such situations, the court or tribunal may intervene to
prevent such injustice and pierce the corporate veil by holding the controlling
shareholder liable.22
“Reverse veil piercing” involves situations where a creditor of the controlling
shareholder is allowed to ignore the separateness of the corporation and its
shareholder to reach the corporation’s assets to satisfy the shareholder’s obligation.
Reverse corporate piercing is ordinarily available only against one-person
corporations to prevent recovery from other innocent shareholders.23
Despite various theories justifying piercing the corporate veil, the general rule of
corporate law is to maintain the legal separateness of the corporate form. Piercing
the veil remains an exception. Approaches towards piercing the veil differ not only
from one jurisdiction to another, but also within one national system of law.24 The
following sections of this article analyze interpretation of piercing the corporate veil
in international arbitration.
III. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
A. Approaches of International Tribunals
In the context of international arbitration, piercing the corporate veil involves
bringing in the parties that have not signed an arbitration agreement. These could be
parent companies, subsidiaries, private individuals, governmental and quasigovernmental entities, and states. Piercing the corporate veil can occur in various

20

OECD, RESPONSIBILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES 6, 24 (1980).

21

Lee Buchheit et al., The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L. J. 1201, 1248 (2007).

22

Id.

23

Id. at 1250.

24

KARL-HEINZ BOECKSTIEGEL, ARBITRATION AND STATE ENTERPRISES: SURVEY
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STATE OF LAW AND PRACTICE 41 (1984).

OF THE
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contexts, such as human rights,25 environment,26 and tax,27 and the principles on
which the adjudicators rely are even more diverse.
In their determination of the merits of a particular dispute, arbitration tribunals
are usually bound by domestic law. As already mentioned, there is no consistency
across national legal systems on the issue of piercing the corporate veil. Not
surprisingly, the approaches of international tribunals also vary.
Generally, arbitrators distinguish between “consenting non-signatories” to
arbitration agreements that seek to arbitrate, and “non-consenting non-signatories”
that resist arbitration.28 The tribunals that join non-signatories rely either on implied
consent or disregard of corporate personality.29 There is no clear line between these
two justifications, however, as tribunals often pierce the corporate veil as a means to
enforce the parties’ original intent.
One of the most well-known examples of piercing the corporate veil for the
benefit of consenting non-signatories is the Dow Chemical International Chamber of
Commerce arbitration.30 In that case, the tribunal allowed parent companies to be
claimants despite the fact that the arbitration clauses were between the defendant and
subsidiary companies of the same parent group.31
The tribunal relied on “the common intent of the parties . . . such as it appears
from the circumstances that surround the conclusion and characterize the
performance and later the termination of contracts.”32 The tribunal also followed
“usages conforming to the needs of international commerce, in particular in the
presence of group of companies.”33 According to the single entity theory applied by
the tribunal, “[a] group of companies, despite the legal status of each of the
companies, represents a single economic reality which the arbitral tribunal must take
into account when ruling on its jurisdiction.”34
However, application of the “group of companies” doctrine remains uncommon.
Some authorities suggest only one out of every four cases that purport to apply the
25

See, e.g., Yaraslau Kryvoi, Enforcing Labor Rights Against Multinational Corporate
Groups in Europe, 46 INDUS. REL. 366 (2007).
26
See, e.g., David Bakst, Piercing the Corporate Veil for Environmental Torts in the
United States and the European Union: The Case for the Proposed Civil Liability Directive,
19 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 323 (1996).
27

See, e.g., William W. Park, Fiscal Jurisdiction and Accrual Basis Taxation: Lifting the
Corporate Veil to Tax Foreign Company Profits, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1609 (1978).
28
See William W. Park, Non-Signatories and the New York Convention, 2 J. DISP. RESOL.
INT’L 84, 105 (2008).
29

Id. at 107.

30

Id. at 103 (citing Dow Chemical v. Isover St. Gobain, ICC Case No. 4131, 1983 J. Dr.
Int'l 899 (1932)).
31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Interim Award of September 23, 1982 in No.4131 (original in French), reprinted in IX
ICCA Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 131, 134 (1984).
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“group of companies” doctrine did actually extend jurisdiction over nonsignatories.35
When it comes to arbitration under bilateral investment treaties, the legal regime
is somewhat different. It has been suggested that the rules relevant to shareholder
claims under investment protection treaties need to be regarded as lex specialis as
established by specific treaties.36 This is so despite the fact that, under the national
law of most jurisdictions, shareholders are not allowed to bring claims on behalf of
the company in which they own shares.37 The inclusion of shareholdings into the
definition of investment in a bilateral investment treaty would normally result in
piercing the corporate veil for the benefit of the shareholder.38
It is not enough to persuade the tribunal to pierce the corporate veil under
applicable law. The enforcement of awards piercing the corporate veil creates
additional problems.
B. Enforcement of Awards
Unlike national courts, arbitration tribunals do not have enforcement mechanisms
of their own and need to resort to national courts. If they render an award against a
party that is not subject to an arbitration agreement, it might lead to problems at the
enforcement stage. According to the principle of autonomy of the arbitration
agreement, such agreements do not necessarily have to be governed by the same
substantive law as the main contract.39
The application of corporate veil piercing in international arbitration is dependent
upon domestic courts’ recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards. The
special procedure is established by the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, better known as the New York
Convention.40
Article V of the New York Convention provides five procedural defects, on
which national courts can rely to refuse recognition and enforcement of arbitration
awards. These are (1) lack of valid arbitration agreement; (2) denial of opportunity
to be heard; (3) an excess of jurisdiction by an arbitrator in deciding matters beyond
35
Park, supra note 28, at 106-07 (citing JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON,
DROIT COMPARE DE L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL ¶¶ 253-54 (2d ed. 2007)).
36

Abbey Cohen Smutny, Claims of Shareholders in International Investment Law, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER 363 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
37

See OECD, supra note 20.

38

For instance, Article 1(6) of the Energy Treaty Charter provides that "Investment"
protected by the Charter includes "a company or business enterprise, or shares, stock, or other
forms of equity participation in a company or business enterprise, and bonds and other debt of
a company or business enterprise." The Energy Charter Treaty art. 1(6), Dec. 17, 1994, 34
I.L.M. 360 (1995).
39

See NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, ALAN REDFERN, & MARTIN HUNTER,
REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 117-21 (2009).
40
UNCITRAL.org, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 1958 (the New York Convention), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/NY-conv/1958_NYC_CTC-e.pdf.
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the scope of the arbitration submission; (4) procedure contrary to the parties’
agreement; and (5) annulment of the award in the country where rendered.41
Arguably, an award rendered against a non-signatory can be challenged on the
basis of any of these grounds, especially if there was no explicit arbitration
agreement. For instance, a company that has not signed the arbitration agreement is
unlikely to be present at the hearings, and is, thus, denied an opportunity to be heard.
Local courts might set aside an arbitration award against the parent company if the
arbitration agreement is only signed by its subsidiary. Moreover, it could indeed be
unfair for a parent company to defend itself in all national jurisdictions where it can
be held liable for the debts of its subsidiary.42
Article II(2) of the 1958 New York Convention, as well as most national legal
systems, provide that the agreement to arbitrate should be in writing. The
requirement that the arbitration agreement be in writing serves a number of
functions, which include providing evidence as to (1) the conclusion of the
agreement, (2) identification of the parties to the agreement, and (3) providing
warning as to the importance of renouncing rights of recourse to the courts.43 If there
is no agreement in writing, tribunals may decide to pierce the corporate veil.
One of the most common grounds for refusal to enforce arbitration awards under
the New York Convention arises from problems connected with a party’s identity in
the absence of a special agreement in writing.44 There are an increasing number of
cases in which the respondent summoned in the arbitration takes the position that it
is not a party to the contract containing the arbitration clause, and, therefore, the
arbitrators lack competence to decide the case as far as the summoned respondent is
concerned.45
Domestic courts apply the New York Convention and limit the enforcement of
arbitral awards to the parties to the arbitration agreement,46 even though the parties
belong to the same corporate group.47 For instance, English courts are not very
enthusiastic about piercing the corporate veil. In Peterson Farms Inc. v. C&M
Farming Ltd., the arbitration award was successfully challenged in England on the
basis that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain claims by entities that were not
specifically named as parties to the arbitration agreement.48
41

Id. at art.V.

42

William W. Park, Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The Expanding Scope of
International Arbitration, 12 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 658, 659 (1986).
43
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law [COITL], Report of the Working Group
on Arbitration on the Work of its Thirty Second Session (Vienna, 20-31 March 2000), ¶ 89,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/468 (April 10, 2000).
44
Albert Jan van den Berg, New York Convention of 1958: Refusals of Enforcement, 18
I.C.C. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 1, 28 (2007).
45

Javor v. Francoeur, 2003 BSCS 330, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 195 (Can.).

46

Van den Berg, supra note 44.

47

See, e.g., Glencore Grain Limited v. Sociedad Ibérica de Molturación, S.A., STS, Jan.
14, 2003 (R.J., 38).
48

Petersen Farms, Inc. v. C&M Farming Ltd., [2004] EWHC (Comm) 121, [2004] 1
LLOYD’S REPORTS 614.
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Many domestic legal systems establish a mandatory requirement that the
arbitration agreement be in writing.49 The United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Working Group on Arbitration proposed
that the “group of companies” fact pattern might not require a written arbitration
agreement.50 The report noted that the “group of companies” theory has been applied
in a number of arbitrations and has met the approval of some courts.51 According to
the report, the concept requires proof of the following:
1) that the legally distinct company being brought under the arbitration
agreement is part of a group of companies that constitutes one economic
reality (une réalité économique unique);
2) that the company played an active role in the conclusion and
performance of the contract; and
3) that including the company under the arbitration agreement reflects the
mutual intention of all parties to the proceedings.52
However, as UNCITRAL noted, national courts increasingly adopt a liberal
interpretation of the requirement of a written contract, construing it in accordance
with international practice and the expectations of the parties.53 UNCITRAL is
particularly concerned that doubts on the interpretation of this requirement, and a
lack of uniformity in its interpretation would reduce the predictability and certainty
of international contractual commitments.54
Despite these new developments at UNCITRAL, the unpredictability with
respect to arbitrations that involves piercing the corporate veil remains a serious
problem. Not only is it unclear whether a particular tribunal would be sympathetic
towards piercing the corporate veil under applicable domestic law, but the parties
must face even greater challenges at the stage of enforcement. ICSID jurisprudence
is of particular interest because it is regulated by the ICSID Convention,55 a special
international treaty that eliminates some of the problems identified above.

49
See, e.g., United States Uniform Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 6 (2000); Arbitration
Act, 1996, c. 23, §6 (UK); Federal Law of the Russian Federation on International
Commercial Arbitration, http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/russia.international.commercial.arbitration
.1993/doc.html.
50
The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on Possible Uniform Rules on
Certain Issues Concerning Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Conciliation, Interim
Measures of Protection, Written Form for Arbitration Agreement, Addendum ¶¶ 11, 12(m),
and 12 n.1 delivered to the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law [COITL], Working
Group on Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108/Add. 1 (Jan. 26, 2000).
51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 3, ¶ 8.

54

Id.

55

ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.

178

GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:169

IV. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN ICSID PROCEEDINGS
A. The Legal Regime Under the ICSID Convention
The empowerment of private parties to submit claims against sovereign states is
one of the most known achievements of the ICSID Convention.56 A less widely
recognized development of international law brought by ICSID jurisprudence is the
increasing willingness of tribunals to pierce the corporate veil.
Unlike awards of other arbitration tribunals, ICSID awards do not need to be
enforced in accordance with the New York Convention. The awards are subject to
recognition in ICSID Contracting States as if they were a final judgment by a
domestic court in that State.57 Under Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention, the
awards are binding on the parties immediately upon rendering.58
ICSID awards should be recognized and enforced by States as a public
international law obligation. It is a generally recognized principle of international
law that a State may not excuse or cure a breach of its obligations by pleading
provisions of its own law.59 Therefore even though parties to the ICSID Convention
may take a very cautious view towards piercing the corporate veil in their domestic
courts, ICSID awards nevertheless will obligate them, even if they are inconsistent
with the domestic law of the enforcing country.
When it comes to piercing the corporate veil, ICSID tribunals permit corporate
parties of ICSID proceedings to submit claims on behalf of non-parties to the
proceedings.60 These non-parties are typically either the investor’s shareholders or
subsidiaries. Because tribunals usually do not "implead" such third parties, such
claims amount to piercing the corporate veil.
It must be noted that the parties may agree to join a non-signatory corporation as
a party to ICSID proceedings at any time.61 However, most controversies arise when
one of the parties does not agree to join a new party and there is a need to pierce the
corporate veil despite one party’s objections.

56

The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is a leading
international arbitration institution in the field of investor-State dispute settlement. It was
established in 1966 as a part of the World Bank pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. See YARASLAU KRYVOI,
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Kluwer Law
International, 2010).
57

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, Oct. 17, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, art. 53(1).
58

Id.

59

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 34, 35 (2008).
60
61

See discussion infra Part III(b).

See, e.g., S. Pac. Prop. (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case
No. ARB/84/3 (Apr. 14, 1988) Decision on Jurisdiction and Dissenting Opinion (Apr. 14,
1988) (ruling that joining the local company was permissible even despite subsequent
objections of the State, because the parties voluntarily agreed to join a local company and it
did not have any claims different from those of the parent company).
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The issues associated with jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals are resolved in
accordance with international, not national, law.62 The tribunals rely on the ICSID
Convention and applicable BITs, as well as on their own jurisprudence, to decide on
the feasibility of piercing the corporate veil.63 According to Article 25(2)(b) of the
ICSID Convention:
[A]ny juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State
other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties
consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any
juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to
the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the parties
have agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State
for the purposes of this Convention.
From a reading of Article 25(2)(b), two criteria for the determination of personal
jurisdiction over corporate entities are apparent. “Nationality” is a formal legal
criterion, while determination of “foreign control is an objective criterion, which
seeks to reach the real control over a juridical person. The issue of establishing
control was heavily debated during the negotiations of the ICSID Convention.64
Although no definition was adopted, the Convention’s drafters thought that it should
be left to each arbitral tribunal to decide the question of control.65
The following section discusses the jurisprudence of ICSID tribunals on the issue
of piercing the corporate veil.
B. Approaches of ICSID Tribunals
1. Formalistic Approach
ICSID Institution Rule 2 provides that the parties to the arbitration shall be
precisely designated, and the parties to the dispute should consent in writing to
submit their dispute to ICSID arbitration.66 A number of ICSID tribunals have
refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-signatories to ICSID arbitration
clauses as discussed below.
Some ICSID tribunals construe ICSID Institution Rule 2 and other similar
provisions narrowly, and are unwilling to extend their jurisdiction over nonsignatories. In Tshinvali v. Georgia, the investor submitted claims on behalf of itself
as well as its three shareholders.67 The tribunal analyzed the issue of standing and
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noted that the three shareholders had not been registered as claimants in those ICSID
proceedings and on this ground ruled that the claimant was not entitled to claim on
behalf of its shareholders.68
The Tshinvali tribunal distinguished its case from other ICSID jurisprudence by
pointing out that there was no parent company where “the ICSID clause is designed
to work for its benefit.”69 The tribunal pointed out that Rule 2 of the ICSID requires
that the request of arbitration precisely designate each party to the dispute, and that
Rule 47 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules provides that the award should contain “a
precise designation of each party.”70 The tribunal explained that:
[N]either the ICSID Convention nor the ICSID Arbitration Rules contain
any express provision permitting parties to assert claims on behalf of nonparties. . . . [A]ny such right to of a complaining party requires the
agreement or “consent” of the respondent Contracting State.71
The Tshinvali tribunal noted that it was not aware of any ICSID cases where “one
single party asserted claims not only on its own behalf but also on behalf of other
non-party entities which were not implicated with a specific written agreement that
constituted the ‘consent’ of the host Contracting State to such an assertion on their
behalf.”72
In other cases, tribunals refrained from going beyond the nationality of the
claimant corporation to examine whether it is foreign-controlled. In Rumeli Telecom
A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Kazakhstan, the tribunal
noted “nowhere in the ICSID Convention is there a basis for piercing the corporate
veil of a designated claimant.”73 The arbitrators rejected the application of the
effective nationality test74 to pierce the corporate veil and reach the real controllers of
the corporate group.75 It must be noted, that in this case by piercing the corporate
veil, the tribunal understood disregarding the separateness of legal entities and
looked into the issue of objective foreign control.
The issue of determination of foreign control is so controversial that it forced a
prominent arbitrator to resign from an ICSID panel in one case. In Tokios Tokeles v.
Ukraine, one of arbitrators resigned because he disagreed with the approach of other
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arbitrators, who extended jurisdiction over a company incorporated in a foreign state,
and 99% of which was controlled by nationals of the Respondent State.76
The arbitrator argued that such a formalistic approach was against the objectives
of the ICSID Convention to not facilitate resolution of international investment
disputes between States and their own nationals.77 The arbitrator also noted that the
issue of piercing the corporate veil under the International Court of Justice’s decision
in Barcelona Traction,78 and the fact that no fraud was involved were beside the
point, given the clear object and purpose of the ICSID Convention.79
In all the ICSID cases discussed above, tribunals followed a formalistic approach
and failed to pierce the corporate veil. The logic is simple: if a corporation is not a
party to ICSID proceedings, and has not signed an arbitration clause, there is no
jurisdiction over it.
2. Treating Non-Signatory Corporations as “Investors”
Other ICSID panels do pierce the corporate veil to see whether the corporation is
indeed controlled by a “foreign investor” under the definition of the ICSID
Convention. Two ICSID cases–Vacuum Salt Products Ltd. v. Republic of Ghana80
and TSA v. Argentina,81 focused precisely on the objective existence of foreign
control under Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention.
In Vacuum Salt Products Ltd. v. Republic of Ghana, the issue was whether the
company was under foreign control, or under the control of Ghana nationals, and as
such, fell outside of the scope of the tribunal’s personal jurisdiction.82 The tribunal
noted that because the Government of Ghana agreed to treat the company as a
foreign national, it created a rebuttable presumption of foreign control for the
purpose of Article 25 of the Convention.83
The Vacuum Salt tribunal noted that the reference in Article 25(2)(b) to “foreign
control” necessarily sets an objective limit beyond which ICSID jurisdiction cannot
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exist, and parties therefore lack power to invoke the same “no matter how devoutly
they desire to do so.”84 The tribunal ruled that if the juridical person not controlled
by foreign investors were allowed to proceed with ICSID claims, the Convention
would be used for purposes for which it was not intended.85
The TSA v. Argentina tribunal also highlighted the importance of determining
real foreign control by noting that it would be inconsistent with Article 25 of the
ICSID Convention if in establishing foreign control,
[i]t would be directed to pierce the veil of the corporate entity national of
the host State and to stop short at the second corporate layer it meets,
rather than pursuing its objective identification of foreign control up to its
real source, using the same criterion with which it started.86
The tribunal ruled that because of the absence of foreign control, it lacked
jurisdiction to examine the merits of the dispute.87
Many commentators favor the extension of ICSID tribunals’ personal jurisdiction
by piercing the corporate veil of foreign-controlled corporations. Christoph Schreuer
points out that having more than one party on the investor’s side in one set of
proceedings is acceptable because it is a consequence of one investment operation
where companies claimed jointly with their parent companies or their subsidiaries.88
The criteria put forward by Schreuer in relation to jurisdiction over locally
incorporated, but foreign controlled companies, are useful. First, he argues that there
need not be an explicit consent to permit claims, as was the case in SPP v. Egypt.89
Second, the fact of foreign control must be established as a question of fact,
determined not just by shareholding.90 Third, not only direct control, but also
indirect control over a locally incorporated company might suffice to establish such
control.91 Schreuer further noted that:
Where companies other than those named in the consent agreement are
not necessary parties but are merely economically associated with the
investment of the investor, they will not be given standing in ICSID
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proceedings. But the parties before the tribunal may be given the right to
represent their interests and to claim on their behalf.92
C.F. Amerasinghe points out that an ICSID tribunal, unlike the International
Court of Justice in Barcelona Traction,93 may consider any other criterion, such as
management, voting rights, shareholding, or any other reasonable theory in
determining jurisdiction over non-signatories.94 One of such theories appears to be
treating locally incorporated companies as a part of the investment protected by the
ICSID Convention or the BIT as explained below.
3. Treating Non-Signatory Corporations as “Investment”
A number of ICSID tribunals regard the use of domestically incorporated
companies to channel investments as “investment” for purposes of ICSID
Convention. Following this logic, if the investor creates local investment vehicles,
his shares and other forms of participation in them constitute investment.
According to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID tribunals have
jurisdiction over “any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment.” The
drafters of the ICSID Convention deliberately decided not to provide a definition for
the term “investment.”95 They assumed that this aspect of ICSID jurisdiction could
be more appropriately controlled by the requirement of consent.96 It has been noted
that “the requirement that the dispute must have arisen out of an ‘investment’ may be
merged into the requirement of consent to jurisdiction.”97
In CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, the tribunal found no bar in
international law for allowing claims by shareholders independently from those of
the corporation concerned.98 The CMS Gas tribunal then looked at the definition of
“investment” and recalled that in accordance with the Argentina-United States BIT,
shares were given as an example of investment during the negotiations of the
Convention.99 The tribunal held that there is “no requirement that an investment, in
order to qualify, must necessarily be made by shareholders controlling a company or
owning the majority of shares.”100
The tribunal pointed out that the principle of separation of legal entities of
Barcelona Traction was not directly relevant to protection of shareholders.101 The
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tribunal explained that Barcelona Traction was concerned only with the exercise of
diplomatic protection and “did not rule out the possibility of extending protection to
shareholders in a corporation in different contexts.”102 The tribunal also found “no
bar in current international law to the concept of allowing claims by shareholders
independently from those of the corporation concerned, not even if those
shareholders are minority or non-controlling shareholders.”103
An ICSID tribunal in Holliday Inns v. Morocco, also focused on interpretation of
the term “investment” and impleaded non-signatories on the basis of the “unity of
investment doctrine.”104 In that case, two parent companies incorporated in the
United States negotiated a joint venture with the government of Morocco to build
hotels.105 In order to carry out the project, the parent companies established wholly
owned Swiss subsidiaries.106 The Government of Morocco signed the “Basic
Agreement” with local subsidiaries that contained a consent to ICSID arbitration
clause.107 The parent companies were not signatories to the Basic Agreement,
although the agreement provided that foreign partners could assign their rights and
obligations to their affiliates.108
The tribunal in Holiday Inns examined the common expectations of the parties
and ruled that the non-signatory U.S. parent companies were proper parties to the
arbitration according to the “unity of investment doctrine,” to fulfil the common
expectations of the parties.109
In another case, IBM v. Ecuador, the U.S. parent company of an Ecuadorian
subsidiary requested arbitration proceedings on the basis of the United StatesEcuador BIT.110 Ecuador alleged that the tribunal had no jurisdiction because there
was no agreement to treat domestic companies as foreign nationals as required by
Rule 2 of the Institution Rules.
The IBM tribunal focused its analysis on whether the dispute referred to an
investment.111 Because the ICSID Convention did not define the term “investment,”
the tribunal looked to ICSID case law and the definition of “investment” under the
BIT.112 The tribunal concluded that the dispute arose from an investment of the U.S.
parent company because
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(1) it made a direct investment of 100% of the capital of the local entity;
(2) the contract concluded by the local entity constituted an investment of
the parent company, since it indirectly belonged to the parent; and (3) the
right to collect money, capital and interest is a legal and contractual right
derived from the contracts, with the parent company being the indirect
owner of that right.113
The tribunal held that the contract was not only a source of obligations, but also “a
mechanism through which capital flows from one country to another.”114 Ecuador’s
objection that the Ecuadorian nationality of the locally incorporated entity precluded
its parent company from initiating ICSID arbitration had been rejected.115
Similarly, in AES Corp. v. Argentina, the ICSID tribunal concluded that because
the definition of “investment” in the Argentina-United States BIT included “every
kind of investment in the territory of one party owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party,” it encompassed local
companies and satisfied the requirement of recognizing an international
investment.116 The tribunal concluded that it was proper for the parent company to
submit claims on behalf of locally incorporated entities it controlled.117
The ICSID tribunal, in Enron v. Argentina, also considered a claim of a foreign
investor alleged on behalf of a company incorporated in the host State.118 The
dispute focused on whether the tribunal had jurisdiction over the locally incorporated
company.119 The tribunal construed the definition of investment under the
Argentina-US BIT, which provided that the term “investment” included, inter alia,
“a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the
assets thereof.”120 The tribunal extended its jurisdiction over the companies because
of the definition of the term “investment” under the treaty: “This definition is the one
that controls the whole discussion. It evidently includes the channelling of
investments through locally incorporated companies, particularly when this is
mandated by the very legal arrangements governing the privatization process in
Argentina.”121
The tribunal interpreted the BIT and concluded that “the Treaty was made with
specific purpose of guaranteeing the rights of foreign investors and encouraging their
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participation in the privatization process,” which itself is sufficient to establish its
personal jurisdiction over a locally incorporated company.122
Aaron Broches, one of the architects of the ICSID Convention also emphasized
the importance of the purpose of the ICSID Convention. He noted in relation to
determination of foreign control under the ICSID Convention, that “any
stipulation . . . based on a reasonable criterion should be accepted,” and jurisdiction
should be declined “only if . . . to do so would permit parties to use the Convention
for purposes for which it was clearly not intended.”123
Indeed, the purpose of the treaty is one of the methods for treaty interpretation
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.124 Since BITs are usually
concluded to facilitate foreign investments, piercing the corporate veil may
legitimately serve that purpose.
The approach of tribunals that treat corporations as “investment” rather than as
“investors” resonates with the theory of corporate law, which considers corporations
as merely legal fictitious entities, not real persons, as discussed at the beginning of
this article. Under this approach, ICSID tribunals focus more on subject matter
jurisdiction over corporations as part of an investment protected by the BIT to
establish personal jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no easy fix to make the corporate veil-piercing jurisprudence of
international tribunals consistent and predictable. However, understanding the
theory of piercing the corporate veil from the corporate law perspective, and keeping
track of the principles on which tribunals rely, will certainly help to predict the
outcomes.
Piercing the corporate veil may help give a concrete practical meaning to the
intent of the parties to an arbitration agreement or purpose of a treaty. However,
there are downsides of such piercing because it negates many of the benefits that the
corporate form offers. The creditors will be in a more difficult position to monitor
assets, and corporations will be unwilling to take business risks that may result in
their shareholders’ corporate or personal assets being exposed to liability.
As a practical matter, it is advisable to make arbitration agreements as inclusive
as possible to avoid dealing with piercing the corporate veil altogether.
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